Project Title: Social Choice Rules
Project Description:
Computer modeling of manipulability of social choice rules: The
research would attempt to assess the relative ease of manipulating
social choice rules by identifying the percentage of profiles on which
the voter, by changing their reported preference, could obtain a more
preferable outcome than if he/she reported truthfully. Related
questions, such as the amount of knowledge of the other individuals'
preferences to be able to successfully manipulate a social choice rule
would also be addressed.
Background Information:
Work in social choice theory has shown that all methods of making
social decisions are subject to manipulation - individuals can do
better by falsely reporting their preferences. This work would attempt
to see how serious a problem this is for various rules that are used
in practice.
Literature References:
Alan Gibbard, "Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result, "
Econometrica, 1973
Requirements:
The sponsor requires that interested students meet the following
requirements: Experience with computers and knowledge of some computer
programming language (Pascal or C).
This opportunity is for:
Caltech students only
Research Sponsor
Sponsor: Richard McKelvey and Fouad Aleskerov
Division: HSS
Mail Code: 228-77
Phone: 4091 (McKelvey)
E-mail: rdm@hss.caltech.edu (McKelvey), fda@hss.caltech.edu (Aleskerov)
For further information about the project, the student should contact:
Richard McKelvey